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1. Introduction 
There remains considerable confusion as to how exactly 
the MiFID and UCITS directives will interact in the long 
run. This uncertainty reflects the growing pains of a 
regulatory transformation that represents no less than a 
tectonic shift from intense and prescriptive product 
regulation to a more flexible, principles-based regulation 
of management functions. Unlike UCITS, MiFID is a 
horizontal directive that cuts across the entire financial 
services industry (except for insurance). Precisely 
because the two directives are rooted in diverging 
regulatory philosophies, they are not natural partners, and 
the exercise of trying to fit the two together will likely be 
neither effortless nor seamless.  
This confusion can be traced to apparently contradictory 
at first sight, or, in the least, ambiguous, wording in the 
MiFID as to how its provisions relate to collective 
investment schemes. In reality, the UCITS-MiFID nexus 
is a web of dizzying complexity, on which this paper 
attempts to shed some light. On the one hand, MiFID 
Recital 15 and Article 2(1)(h) state that collective 
investment schemes (whether or not coordinated at EU 
level), their management companies and depositaries are 
excluded from the scope of MiFID provisions. Since 
UCITS are collective investment undertakings that are 
coordinated at Community level, they, their managers 
and depositaries do not come under MiFID rules. 
On the other hand, UCITS are listed in Section C of 
MiFID Annex I as MiFID financial instruments. 
Therefore, in their dealings with clients involving 
transactions in UCITS, all MiFID firms must apply 
conduct of business rules, which include best execution 
and suitability.
2 Yet conduct of business rules do not 
 
                                                        
2 The classification of UCITS under Article 19(6) as a ‘non-
complex’ financial instrument by default means it can be 
 
apply to eligible counterparties, otherwise known as ‘per 
se financial institutions’. And MiFID Article 24(2) binds 
member states’ competent authorities to recognise as 
eligible counterparties UCITS and their management 
companies, meaning that in their transactions with 
investment firms, they are by default not afforded 
conduct of business protections. However, investment 
managers (including UCITS) can request under the same 
article to have their transactions protected by MiFID’s 
conduct of business rules, including best execution.  
In addition, despite the Article 2(1)(h) exemption, MiFID 
Article 66 brings some UCITS management company 
functions under the scope of MiFID (see Table1). Thus, 
UCITS management companies are subject to both the 
UCITS and MiFID directives: when providing ancillary 
investment services (investment advice, individual 
portfolio management, etc.) they are governed by MiFID, 
whereas the UCITS directive covers the designation of 
management companies. Under the original UCITS 
directive, management companies could only provide 
collective investment services. But under the ‘product 
directive’ component of UCITS III, the services that 
management companies could provide were extended to 
cover individual portfolio management, allowing them to 
compete directly with portfolio managers, who carry out 
these activities under a MiFID license.
3 The decision to 
apply certain conduct of business rules to UCITS 
management companies that are undertaking individual 
portfolio management was a necessary consequence of 
the wider powers managers of UCITS were given under 
                                                                                                  
exempted from the appropriateness test in Article 19(5) for 
execution-only transactions. 
3 FSA, 2006, DP06/03: Implementing MiFID’s best execution 
requirements, May, p. 20, which cites Article 5(3) of the 
UCITS Directive, as amended by Directive 2001/107/EC. 
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UCITS III: its purpose was to ensure that a level playing 
field emerges in the management of individual portfolios, 
whether by MiFID-authorised investment managers or by 
UCITS management companies.  
Table 1. MiFID provisions that apply to UCITS 
MiFID 
provisions 
that apply to 
UCITS 
management 
companies 
 
 
  Dealings as counterparty to public authorities 
(art. 2.2) 
  Cross-border takeover of a company (art. 10(4)) 
if it leads to a qualifying holding in that firm 
  Capital requirements (art. 12) 
  Organisational requirements (art. 13) (in 
particular conflicts of interest) 
  Conduct of business obligations (art. 19) (in 
particular suitability and best execution) 
 
These only apply when the following services are 
provided: 
  Discretionary portfolio management 
  Investment advice 
  Custody and administration 
 
The interaction between UCITS and MiFID is further 
complicated by the Article 3(1) exemption that leaves 
discretion to the individual EU member states to decide 
whether to apply MiFID to legal persons that only 
receive/transmit orders in UCITS, that do not hold any 
clients’ funds, and that only transact with certain 
counterparties. Because these various options and 
possible exemptions raise serious concerns for a level 
playing field at the pan-European level, it would be 
sensible for the European Commission to clarify to what 
degree UCITS funds would potentially be affected by the 
Article 3(1) carve-out.  
Table 2. Provisions that apply to UCITS: MiFID or 
member state discretion 
UCITS funds  MiFID  Member state 
discretion 
Fund distribution undertaken by an 
investment firm  X   
Fund distribution undertaken by fund 
management company   X 
Fund distribution undertaken neither 
by a UCITS management company 
nor a MiFID investment firm 
 X 
Investment advice on collective 
investment scheme given by 
investment firm 
X 
 
Advice exclusively relating to 
collective investments given by fund 
management company 
 
X 
Advice on collective investments 
combined with other instruments 
given by the fund management 
company 
X 
 
Advice on collective investment that 
is part of a package or ‘wrap’  X   
Reception/transmission of orders re-
lating to collective investments only  
  X 
Self-managed UCITS, distribution 
and advice 
       X (?) 
The various layers of interaction, options and carve-outs 
described above paint a complex picture of the MiFID-
UCITS nexus. Its more precise articulation over time will 
result in a robust learning-by-doing exercise for market 
participants and regulators alike. It will likely involve 
hiccoughs along the way. The Asset Management Sector 
Leader of the FSA, Dan Waters, playing on a phrase 
coined by the former US Secretary of Defense, has 
described the interaction between the UCITS and MiFID 
Directives as being “…full of both known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns.”
4 His is a not so subtle recognition 
that regulators just as much as market participants have 
yet to come to a better understanding of how the two 
directives will fit together in practice.  
At the same time, these differences are in many respects 
technical, they only touch a few areas, and they do not 
mean that UCITS and MiFID are fundamentally 
incompatible. At a very high level, and overlooking some 
of the technical points where the fit is not perfect, the 
boundary between UCITS and MiFID is fairly clear. 
While UCITS governs the constitution, management, 
administration and process around the launch of a fund, 
MiFID governs commercial agreements between 
providers and distributors, as well as services related to 
distribution (e.g. brokerage and advice). As mentioned 
above, there are however a few important exceptions 
from this stylised picture, notably:  
1.  Where UCITS market their own funds or delegate 
this activity to an agent; 
2.  Execution – the boundary between UCITS and 
MiFID is not explicitly clear with regard to rules 
surrounding execution: the subscription/redemption 
of units in UCITS is governed by the UCITS 
directive, while the reception/transmission of client 
orders in UCITS is governed by MiFID; and 
3.  Where UCITS management companies carry out 
individual portfolio management in addition to their 
core activity of collective investment management. 
The importance of getting these points resolved quickly 
should not be underestimated. If – as the current 
legislative framework seems to suggest – UCITS 
management companies can market and sell their funds 
cross-border under the UCITS rules, without being 
subjected to the MiFID regime which applies when 
MiFID investment firms distribute those same funds, 
there is a fundamental incoherence in the regulatory 
architecture governing the marketing and selling of 
UCITS. In addition, there is evidence that member states 
are moving to address this disconnect in an 
uncoordinated manner, which could fragment the UCITS 
market. While some member states are deciding to 
impose MiFID rules on their own management 
                                                        
4 “Opening up European markets for fund distribution: the 
impact of MiFID on UCITS distribution”, speech by Dan 
Waters, Asset Management Sector Leader, FSA, City & 
Financial Croup Conference, London, 18 January 2007. Shedding Light on the UCITS-MiFID Nexus | 3 
companies or on foreign ones when they sell cross-border 
into their jurisdictions, others do not.  
2.  Uneven playing fields? 
The degree of confusion prevailing among both 
regulators and market participants is worrisome to the 
extent that it could bring about further compliance, 
administrative and IT costs upon the industry, as well as 
stifle innovation in both product development and in the 
evolution of the industry architecture (models of 
distribution, outsourcing, etc.) through continued 
regulatory uncertainty.  In addition, the same options and 
exemptions mentioned above, which are the source of the 
confusion as to how MiFID and UCITS will interact, 
raise serious concerns about whether a level playing field 
will exist in the European investment management 
business post-MiFID. 
Broadly speaking, there are five areas where MiFID 
impacts most on the asset management business: best 
execution, outsourcing, product fact disclosures, conflicts 
of interest and inducements. To the extent that some 
actors in the UCITS market face MiFID best execution 
rules that are considerably stricter than those under the 
UCITS directive governing actors in the same market 
raises legitimate concerns about a distorted playing field.  
Best execution 
Concerning best execution, the investment management 
industry does not come under a harmonised set of rules, 
since some entities will fall under the light-touch UCITS 
regime for execution (taken from ISD Article 11 on 
conduct of business, which only sets out very high level 
principles), and others will be subjected to MiFID’s more 
detailed rules on execution.
5 More precisely, 
management companies executing transactions in the 
process of managing collective investments do not come 
under MiFID’s onerous best execution rules. They do 
when providing individual portfolio management 
services. The European Commission has clearly stated 
that where a UCITS management company outsources 
the management of a UCITS to an investment firm under 
Art 5(g) of the UCITS directive, the investment firm 
must give the UCITS conduct of business protections and 
                                                        
5 Specifically, the requirements to: implement an execution 
policy and obtain client consent to it prior to dealing with 
clients and conduct ongoing monitoring of execution quality 
delivered by the various regulated markets, MTFs and brokers 
used, based on the execution factors which the firm prioritises. 
In order to make the review of execution policy effective, firms 
will have to come up with metrics to quantify, or at least make 
a credible qualitative assessment of, execution quality. This 
exercise is particularly difficult for execution factors which are 
not easily quantifiable, such as likelihood of execution, market 
impact, etc.  
treat it as a professional or retail client.
6 However, where 
the management company retains investment 
management functions and transacts with investment 
firms, it is to be considered an eligible counterparty, in 
line with MiFID Art 24(2). 
Broadening the debate beyond UCTIS, the French 
Market Regulator (Autorité des Marchés Financiers), has 
already declared its misgivings about the uneven 
application of best execution requirements among 
management companies: “As regards the best execution 
requirement, non-uniform treatment of management 
companies subject to MiFID in respect of all or part of 
their business and management companies not subject to 
MiFID (those that manage only non-UCITS or only 
UCITS, for example), seems hard to justify.”
7 
Outsourcing 
The emphasis on fund management companies in the 
various MiFID exemptions and UCITS revision leaves 
one to wonder where and under what conditions self-
managed UCITS fall under the MiFID umbrella. Under 
the UCITS Directive, both fund management companies 
and self-managed funds (e.g. SICAVs) may delegate 
investment management, administration and distribution 
functions to third party service providers. In the case of 
delegation of the distribution, which set of rules prevails, 
those of UCITS or of MiFID?  
Fact disclosures 
Under UCITS Article 28, UCITS management companies 
must disclose entry and exit commissions as well as other 
expenses or fees. The Commission’s 2004 
Recommendation encouraged Member States to require 
UCITS to publish in the simplified prospectus total 
expense ratios (TERs) in order to better reflect the total 
operating costs of the fund.
8 However, the non-binding 
nature of the Recommendation means that Member States 
have introduced different forms of TERs, making cross-
border comparisons of costs difficult. MiFID also 
requires disclosure of costs and associated charges under 
Article 19(3). To the extent that Article 34(2) of the 
MiFID implementing directive
9 considers the simplified 
prospectus to be sufficient information for the purposes 
of MiFID Article 19(3), MiFID firms which distribute 
UCITS will import the uneven application of disclosure 
of costs and charges that result from the patchy 
implementation of the Commission’s 2004 
Recommendation. In addition, level playing field issues 
                                                        
6 See the European Commission’s FAQ on MiFID, Question 
97: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/questions/ 
index_en.htm. 
7 AMF, Consultation on enforcing the best-execution principles 
in MiFID and its implementing directive, 25 July 2006, 
http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7274_1.pdf. 
8 Commission Recommendation 2004/384/EC of 27 April 
2004. 
9 Directive 2006/73/EC. 4 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
are raised by Recital 55 of the MiFID implementing 
directive. Notwithstanding Article 34(2) of the same 
Directive, Recital 55 requires investment firms 
distributing units in UCITS to additionally inform their 
clients about all the other costs and associated charges 
related to their provision of investment services in 
relation to units in UCITS. It is unclear how these 
disclosures are to be made, or what information precisely 
is required, leaving scope for divergent interpretations at 
the national level. 
Conflicts of interest 
As with best execution, the UCITS requirements on 
conflicts of interest are lighter touch than those of 
MiFID. The core duty of care to clients that is the 
backbone of MiFID conduct of business rules is given in 
Article 19 (1), which requires investment firms, when 
providing investment services and/or, where appropriate, 
ancillary services to clients, to “act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
clients”. Similarly, the UCITS Directive sets forth 
comparable requirements for collective investment 
management.
10 Notably, Article 5h, Directive 
2001/107/EC lists a set of principles a management 
company shall respect (take from the ISD), i.e.: (i) acting 
honestly and fairly in conducting its business activities in 
the best interests of the UCITS it manages and the 
integrity of the market; (ii) acting with due skill, care and 
diligence, in the best interests of the UCITS it manages 
and the integrity of the market; (iii) trying to avoid 
conflicts of interests and, when they cannot be avoided, 
ensuring that the UCITS it manages are fairly treated, and 
(iv) complying with all regulatory requirements 
applicable to the conduct of its business activities so as to 
promote the best interests of its investors and the integrity 
of the market. To give effect to these provisions, a 
UCITS management company must be “structured and 
organised in such a way as to minimise the risk of 
UCITS’ or clients’ interests being prejudiced by conflicts 
of interest between the company and its clients, between 
one of its clients and another, between one of its clients 
and a UCITS or between two UCITS”.
11 
MiFID, on the other hand, requires firms to “maintain 
and operate effective organisational and administrative 
arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps 
designed to prevent conflicts of interest from adversely 
affecting the interests of its clients”.
12 Where firms are 
not satisfied that the controls they have put into place 
around a conflict are sufficient to manage it, they must 
disclose the conflict to clients. In addition, they must 
maintain a register of those conflicts of interest, including 
                                                        
10 See Article 10 (2), UCITS I Directive 85/611/EEC: “The 
management company must act independently and solely in the 
interest of the unit-holders”; and Article 5h, Directive 
2001/107/EC.  
11 UCITS Directive 2001/107/EC, Article 5f (1) (b). 
12 See MiFID, Article 13 (3). 
potential conflicts, which they have identified as giving 
rise to potential client detriment. Those registers of 
conflicts, as well as their attendant controls, must be 
reviewed occasionally by the firm. This all means that the 
administrative requirements around the management of 
conflicts of interest are significantly more burdensome 
for MiFID authorised firms, as opposed to those 
authorised under UCITS. While this will not necessarily 
lead to inefficiencies (given the stylised picture given 
above of MiFID as regulation distribution and UCITS the 
manufacturing and management of funds), it could lead 
to arbitrage where firms conduct activities which are 
caught in the UCITS-MiFID grey zone. 
Inducements 
MiFID takes a very strong stance on inducements, with a 
view to forcing more transparency in the market for the 
distribution of retail investment products, and to 
removing biases in investment advice that arise from 
product providers paying distributors a commission. The 
starting point is that inducements are banned, unless they 
meet the strict criteria laid out in Article 26 of the MiFID 
Level 2 Implementing Directive. Firms can only receive 
fees, commission or non-monetary benefits in relation to 
services providers to clients in the following cases:  
-  when the commissions/benefits are paid or provided 
to or by the client (or by a person acting on his 
behalf);   
-  when the commissions/benefits are paid or provided 
to or by a third party (or by a person acting on his 
behalf) if two cumulative sub-conditions are fulfilled: 
disclosure of such commissions/benefits to the client 
plus need for enhancing the quality of the service 
through the payment of the commission.  
-  when the commissions are necessary for the 
provision of the services and cannot give rise to 
conflicts of interest for ensuring acting in the best 
interests of the client.  
These provisions might create difficulties for widely 
accepted distribution practices in the fund management 
industry, namely the retrocession of fees from product 
providers to distributors. In particular, in some instances 
product providers and intermediaries (which are not in 
the same immediate parent company) may be 
contemplating significant up – front payments as a 
condition for the provider’s products being placed on, or 
even considered for, the intermediary's panel or 
recommended list. These payments would be 
unconnected with, and additional to, conventional 
commissions which would be paid on the sale of 
particular products. Such payments would not be 
consistent with the standards of conduct for firms – 
irrespective of whether they will be "whole of market" or 
“multi-tied”. Such introductory payments are thus 
incompatible with the fundamental principle that a firm 
must not conduct business under arrangements that might 
give rise to a conflict with its duty to customers.  Shedding Light on the UCITS-MiFID Nexus | 5 
Where UCITS are distributed by MiFID firms, the latter 
will have to comply with the rules on inducements. 
Because UCITS management companies are allowed to 
distribute third party funds under the Management 
Company Directive (at least according to CESR’s 
interpretation), it was considered necessary to extend 
MiFID rules on inducements to cover the remuneration 
agreements struck between UCITS management 
companies and the fund management groups whose funds 
they may distribute in addition to their own, precisely in 
order to ensure that the playing field would be level. 
How exactly the complex interaction between the UCITS 
and MiFID Directives plays out in practice will therefore 
have an important impact on the European fund industry, 
not least because UCITS constitute the vast majority of 
funds in the EU. This interaction is further complicated 
by the very real possibility that MiFID will be applied 
and interpreted differently in the various EU Member 
States, meaning that the way MiFID and UCITS interact 
is also likely to vary from Member State to Member 
State. In reality, the potential impact of MiFID on the 
asset management industry, especially on distribution, 
could well reach far beyond what anyone had anticipated, 
or indeed, the European Commission intended. 
3.  Further impact of MiFID on asset management 
sector 
The practical consequences of the application of the 
MiFID regime to UCITS might become very burdensome 
for UCITS management companies: as soon as they 
develop the MiFID services mentioned above, they will 
have to comply with a comprehensive set of rules 
regarding their organisation and functioning, and will still 
have to comply with the UCITS Directive provisions 
regarding their core activity of UCITS fund management. 
One can at least identify six areas of impact for those 
services apart from collective portfolio management.  
1.  Many functions have to be organised in an 
independent way (e. g. compliance function; risk 
management; internal audit). Although the MiFID 
provides that this requirement can be softened or 
exempted with a proportionality test (i.e. for SMEs in 
particular), some of these exemption cases will be 
offered only if the management company is able to 
prove that it fulfilled the conditions to be exempted.  
2.  The restrictions and internal disclosure of personal 
transactions of management companies’ staff is 
regulated in detail by the MiFID. This might raise 
concerns as for instance the scope of relevant persons 
is now extended to relatives (including partners for 
instance) and professional relations. Regarding 
relatives, we do not know yet how Member States 
will be able to strike the right balance between this 
requirement and the European and national 
obligations on data protection (which have to be 
applied for the MiFID transposition – see Recital 43 
of Level 1 MiFID). In addition, those transactions 
will have to be disclosed ‘promptly’ (Art. 12 (b)), 
which might create some difficulties of organisation 
in the daily work of compliance officers of 
management companies.  
3.  The management companies will have to deal not 
only with actual conflicts of interest but also with 
potential ones (Art. 21 Level 2 MiFID). It might raise 
difficulties as by nature some potential conflicts of 
interest are not always easy to anticipate.  
4.  The files of clients of management companies will 
have to be reclassified as the MiFID introduces a 
distinction between eligible counterparts, 
professional clients and retail clients. But the 
question of a grand-fathering clause for the treatment 
of existing clients’ files (requiring or not new 
information today for already existing clients’ files) 
is not answered by the MiFID.  
5.  Regarding best execution, even though this full 
requirement is only imposed on investment firms 
executing the transactions themselves (in general, the 
brokers), management companies will have to 
comply with it in the following way. When 
management companies provide individual portfolio 
management services or for the service of 
reception/transmission of orders, they have to 
transmit the orders to brokers for execution. The 
MiFID requires that the management companies have 
to provide for a ‘transmission policy’ which ensures 
that brokers have been selected by the management 
companies among those presenting the objective 
criteria of offering a high probability of best 
execution of orders. It means that management 
companies will not be responsible for the best 
execution of orders in practice as those orders are 
executed by the brokers, but that they will have to 
justify the way they have established their 
‘transmission policy’.  
Box 1. Substantive references to UCITS and collective 
investments in the MiFID directive (2004/39/EC) 
and implementing directive 
Recital 15 and Article 2(1)(h) – collective investment 
undertakings, whether coordinated at the EU level (i.e. 
UCITS) or not, together with their managers and 
depositaries do not fall under the scope of MiFID. 
Article 3(1) – Member States can decide whether or not to 
apply the MiFID to legal persons that only receive/transmit 
units in collective investment undertakings and that do not 
hold any clients’ funds and that only transact with certain 
counterparties. 
Article 10(4) – Cross-border acquisitions by UCITS 
management companies that would result in a ‘qualifying 
holding’
13 are subject to Article 60
14 subject to certain 
conditions. 
                                                        
13 As defined in MiFID Art. 4 (27). 6 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
Article 19(6) – Because UCITS is qualified as a non-
complex instrument, investment firms do not need to apply 
the appropriateness test mentioned in Article 19(5) when on 
an execution-only basis.  
Article 24(2) – UCITS and their management companies 
must be recognised as eligible counterparties by member 
states’ regulatory authorities, which means MiFID’s conduct 
of business rules do not apply for these transactions. 
However, this does not preclude them from requesting to 
opt-down (higher standard of investor protection) to a lower 
classification for the purposes of seeking protection under 
conduct of business rules.  
Article 66 – Certain MiFID articles will apply to UCITS 
management companies, including capital requirements, 
organisational requirements and conduct of business rules 
(see Table 2 above). 
Recital 55  (Implementing directive 2006/73/EC) – 
Although Article 34 of Directive 2006/73/EC states that the 
simplified prospectus is enough for the purposes of directive 
2004/39/EC, investment firms distributing units in UCITS 
should additionally inform their clients about all the other 
costs and associated charges related to their provision of 
investment services in relation to units in UCITS. 
Article 34(2) (Implementing directive 2006/73/EC) – The 
simplified prospectus is sufficient information for the 
purposes of MiFID Article 19(3) on disclosing costs and 
charges associated with investing in a fund. 
4.  MiFID and the distribution of non-harmonised 
products 
Much of the debate surrounding the Commission’s work 
on the Green and White Papers has focused on eligible 
assets – i.e. which instruments could eventually be 
regarded as suitable for inclusion in a UCITS portfolio 
and which can not. The advantage of having a product 
that is harmonised at the European level like UCITS is 
that these funds can be marketed across the EU on the 
basis of a single offering document, the simplified 
prospectus, and under a single set of rules, which is not 
the case for non-harmonised funds.  
With the proliferation of financial instruments, there has 
been significant pressure on the Commission (and CESR 
by extension) to widen the definition of eligible assets 
(which is the only way to widen the range of products 
that can be included in a UCITS without necessitating 
changes to the existing legislative framework). This 
pressure also arises from the fact that the market for 
UCITS, while originally designed essentially for retail 
investors, is today permeated with institutional players 
who seek to piggy-back on the passport for a ‘retail’ 
product as the only means to efficiently market a fund 
cross-border, even in the institutional space. In this 
respect, there have been and continue to be attempts to 
shoe-horn various alternative products into UCITS, even 
                                                                                                  
14 MiFID Article 60 relates to the consultations among the 
different competent authorities of the member states prior to 
the authorisation of cross-border business.  
though they may not be a particularly good fit for retail 
investors. This reality will necessitate a careful balancing 
act for regulators between on the one hand preserving the 
standard of investor protection for which UCITS is 
known, and on the other hand making the brand flexible 
enough to respond to ever greater competitive pressures 
in the global fund market – at least until a pan-European 
private placement regime or a light-touch harmonised 
regime for the treatment of unregulated funds, is in place. 
The problem with trying to ‘shoe-horn’ different products 
into the UCITS framework is that the exercise of defining 
eligible assets for UCITS is outdated. It is neither 
sustainable given the existing institutional framework, 
nor does it adequately take account of the lessons of 
modern portfolio theory.
15 Critics will contend however 
that it is precisely this measured consideration of eligible 
instruments that has contributed to the reputation of the 
UCITS brand as ensuring a high degree of investor 
protection.  
On the other hand, from an industry perspective, the 
accelerated pace of financial innovation means that the 
exercise of reconsidering which instruments are suitable 
for UCITS is handcuffed by the slow legislative 
machinery and therefore not conducive to facilitating a 
competitive EU fund market. The industry sees a distinct 
possibility in MiFID to by-pass this bottleneck. The 
Commission’s expert groups on alternative investments 
have recommended that alternative investment funds (e.g. 
hedge funds) be distributed to retail investors on a cross-
border basis on the basis of MiFID’s distribution 
framework without imposing any additional product or 
management regulation at EU level.
16 In other words, this 
suggestion would amount to a pure mutual recognition 
regime for alternative investment funds without any 
minimal level of harmonisation at EU level of the 
product. This is rather wishful thinking in light of the 40 
years’ EU experience with single market legislation 
(historical precedent shows that without a minimum 
degree of harmonised legislation at EU level, a single 
market cannot emerge).  
In addition to the unrealistic ambition of a pure mutual 
recognition regime (i.e., one where there is no minimal 
product harmonisation at EU level), one has to consider 
whether regulators would really accept to passport an 
alternative investment fund across the EU without any 
form of (at least minimally) harmonised pan-European 
product regulation. The answer from CESR is very clear: 
impossible.
17 CESR’s objections are based upon two 
                                                        
15 See Casey (2006). 
16 See Recommendations 1 and 4 of the Report of the 
Alternative Investment Expert Group: Managing, Servicing 
and Marketing Hedge Funds in Europe, European Commission 
(2006).  
17 For a more detailed view, see: CESR (2006), CESR’s 
reaction to the reports of the Commission expert groups on 
market efficiency and on alternative investment funds, 
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grounds. First, retail investor protection: in CESR’s view, 
distribution rules are simply too lax under MiFID for 
alternative investments to be marketed to retail investors 
without any further product regulation. Second, the 
competitive effect: if alternative investments can be 
marketed to retail clients only on the basis of MiFID 
suitability/ appropriateness tests, the playing field in the 
European fund market would be severely distorted to the 
advantage of alternative funds. 
UCITS is widely seen to be a major success story in 
Europe, the only example of a truly successful pan-
European retail market for financial services to date. 
Today, it is a globally-recognised brand that is 
synonymous with investor protection and sound product 
quality. This success should be built upon, rather than 
undermined. No doubt markets move fast and the existing 
regulatory framework ought to reflect these changes. It is 
necessary, for example, to examine whether the quality of 
UCITS is indeed consistently superior on average (in 
terms of risk-return profiles) to that of alternative 
investment funds, on which no clear-cut answer has been 
given so far, although inclusion of some portion of 
derivative instruments seems to have got a positive 
impact (European Commission, 2008). If not, there 
would be little reason to object to the wider inclusion of 
complex instruments in UCITS. But at the same time, one 
must be aware that confidence in the widely-recognised 
UCITS label could be easily destroyed: building the trust 
and confidence of (international) investors in certain 
products takes years, and clumsy action by regulators 
could destroy this confidence overnight.  
The continuing uneven playing field between various 
savings products is therefore very worrying. Relying on 
MiFID alone for the distribution of alternative investment 
funds to a retail market audience without any additional 
product regulation would only exacerbate the problem. 
Indeed, the possibility for distributors to market an 
alternative investment fund across the EU under the 
MiFID distribution passport but without the attendant 
UCITS product passport would undermine the very 
raison d’être of the UCITS brand – a high level of 
investor protection through a combination of product 
regulation and management regulation – effectively 
driving UCITS out of the market. As a consequence, 
vigilance and careful reflection are required on the part of 
regulators as they determine how exactly the MiFID 
distribution passport will apply to alternative investment 
funds, and whether this application is compatible with the 
UCITS Directive. 
Currently, there is significant confusion in the 
marketplace as to how alternative investments will fit 
into the already tense MiFID-UCITS interaction. Under 
MiFID, it is not sure that a product has to be harmonised 
at the European level to enjoy pan-European distribution. 
All that is required for the (advised) sales of MiFID 
financial instruments is the suitability test and an 
appropriateness test for execution-only transactions 
(except under certain conditions). This looser regulatory 
framework (in the sense that MiFID does not regulate 
products) might apply not only to alternative investment 
funds, depending on how MiFID is ultimately interpreted, 
but also to structured product wrappers around these 
investments.  
The probability that cross-border sales of alternative 
investment funds be done under MiFID without any kind 
of pan-European sales framework is less probable than 
for structured products. This is because structured 
products are already widely available in the retail market 
in many European countries, mostly due to the capital 
protection at maturity built into many of them. As a 
result, even if some national regulators in the EU were to 
prevent the cross-border distribution of non-harmonised 
funds into their jurisdictions under a MiFID distribution 
license only, it is well possible that investment firms 
could offer structured notes around a portfolio of hedge 
funds to retail investors cross-border under MiFID. To 
the extent that structured products, or a portfolio which 
includes complex financial instruments such as options 
and other derivatives, might successfully replicate the 
risk-return profiles of UCITS funds, and might be 
marketed cross-border under MiFID without any form of 
product regulation, they will have a significant advantage 
over UCITS in terms of the regulatory framework. So 
long as these products can be considered 'transferable 
securities' under MiFID, they qualify for pan-European 
distribution under a MiFID license. 
This possibility will require a review by the Commission 
into the definition of ‘transferable securities’, which 
currently could be taken to mean various structured 
products under Article 4(1)(18)b, which mentions ‘bonds 
or other forms of securitised debt’. This definition could 
potentially include CDOs, CLOs, and various derivatives 
thereof. For the reasons stated in the paragraph above, 
without a more precise definition of the term 
‘transferable securities’, the UCITS market faces a 
severe threat from a new range of structured products 
with alternative investments as underlying. 
Another important question in the debate on the ‘MiFID-
isation’ of alternative investment funds and products 
relates to whether financial advisors are truly competent 
enough to handle complex instruments and non-
harmonised funds without the end-investor enjoying any 
kind of additional protection in the form of product 
regulation. There are good reasons to doubt this to be the 
case. Additionally, one must consider whether 
Independent Financial Advisers or ill-trained personnel at 
the point of sale in bank branches will really be capable 
of keeping pace with and understanding the vast influx of 
complex new products sufficiently well to act as the 
ultimate safeguard of investor well-being in a world 
devoid of product regulation. Will there not likely be a 
significantly enhanced risk of mis-selling under such 
circumstances? For this reason, any move away from 
product regulation must be accompanied by rigorous 
exercises to ensure sales forces are trained and competent 
to advise these products and are treating customers fairly. 8 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
In the view of this author, MiFID should not be seen to 
grant a passport to the cross-border distribution to retail 
investors of any or all non-harmonised collective 
schemes and structured products with alternative 
investments as underlyings. But as it currently stands, it 
remains very unclear whether or how regulators will 
prevent alternative investments from being distributed 
cross-border to a retail audience under MiFID. It is 
therefore essential that a proper articulation of how 
MiFID applies to the cross-border sales of non-
harmonised products be developed as soon as possible. 
How broad a reading of MiFID is adopted by the 
Commission and national regulatory bodies will be 
critical to determining the future success of UCITS as a 
brand. 
It is also useful to highlight how insurance products, 
some of which (e.g. unit-linked) can compete directly 
with UCITS without a similar degree of harmonised 
regulation, also (currently) enjoy a skewed playing field. 
One of the main causes of the unequal playing field 
between products is the differing conditions for the 
oversight and control over marketing documents  for 
‘financial products’ and ‘insurance products’.
18 In view 
of the above discussion, the exclusion of insurance 
products from the scope of MiFID does not make any 
sense, and should be urgently addressed. The comparable 
rules under the EU’s insurance mediation directive 
(2002/92/EC)  are not comparable to the regime that 
MiFID has brought in place.  
In this vein, the conclusions of the May 2007 EU Council of 
Finance Ministers are very welcome. The Council 
emphasised the importance of consistency between MiFID 
and UCITS, and insisted “to ensure, in the context of retail 
distribution of, and advice on,  UCITS, that all steps are 
taken by the Commission and the Member States in 
enforcing the conduct of business rules provided for in the 
MiFID, (…) and stresses the need for clearly ensuring the 
coherence of application of the MiFID and the UCITS 
directives.” The Council further invited the Commission “to 
review the consistency of EU legislation regarding the 
different types of retail investment products (such as unit-
linked life insurance, investment funds, certain structured 
notes and certificates), so as to ensure a coherent approach 
to investor protection and to avoid any mis-selling 
possibilities.”
19 The European Commission has opened a 
consultation on the subject, but it is clear that, in view of the 
foregoing discussion, the answer will not be easy.
20 
                                                        
18 Delmas-Marsalet Report on the marketing of financial 
instruments (AMF, 2005, p. 18). 
19 Casey & Lannoo (2008), p. 28.  
20 See European Commission (2007). 
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